The Origin of the Good

Is that which is good made good by God, or does he name “good” that which is already good?

This is a question that my ethics students will have to wrestle with this week. At first glance, maybe it doesn’t seem like a terribly difficult question to answer. But to a philosopher, to a person dealing with logical, deductive arguments, it actually creates quite a conundrum.

Let me back up a minute and set up the framework.

This question is posed within the context of theologically based ethics, or ethics that depend on a theistic religious perspective as the framework for ethical decision making. Religion has been the most relied-upon ethical framework throughout history, so it is a valuable place to start when you’re studying ethics.

Theism typically involves belief in a God that is described using “omni-properties” or what we call “necessary attributes.” The main three that come into the discussion in philosophy are omnipotence (meaning “all-powerful”), omniscience (“all-knowing”) and omnibenevolence (“all-good”). The claim is that in order for God to be God, all three of these necessary attributes must be in place; otherwise, belief in God as a deity is not justified.

In Ethics (a branch of philosophy), the discussion of morality brings into question omnipotence and omnibenevolence. The conflict arises when the origin of morality is questioned.

Here’s the argument:

If God determines what is morally good (“pious”), then he is able to arbitrarily decide to make “good” whatever he chooses. It is within his power (omnipotence) to do so, but can he truly claim to be all-good (omnibenevolent) if he is able to call “good” whatever he wants with no boundaries or constraints?

If God merely names “good” that which was made good outside his power, he does not truly have power over all (omnipotence), for something outside of himself had creative and authoritative power over which he did not rule.

So the argument says that God is either not omnipotent or not omnibenevolent, but to render void either of these attributes is to strip God of his divinity.

And here philosophy is often stumped. The original claim has been shown to be faulty, so the correct response is to reform the claim so that the flaws are addressed and then start again. But how do we fix this claim without changing the very nature of God himself?

Just as a refresher, here’s the original claim: In order for God to be God, he must be omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.

Can we remove omnipotence or omnibenevolence and still have a God who is trustworthy, approachable, and worthy of worship and devotion? I don’t believe so.

Another option is to simply say that because God is not a created being, he is not bound by the logic of created beings.

Maybe this is not entirely false, but I’m not sure it’s entirely true, either.

What I do think is that philosophy just comes up short. It runs out of answers.

It needs the help of another angle.

It needs theology.

Now, please understand that theologically based ethics and the accompanying dilemma are not limited to any one religion. All theistic religions find themselves faced with this problem. But I’m going to speak to it now from a Christian theological perspective.

I started my post with this question: Is that which is good made good by God, or does he name “good” that which is already good?

My answer to this question is a simple, “Yes.” Because God both creates that which is good and he names it.

That settles the issue of his omnipotence, but it still leaves in question his omnibenevolence. Does God arbitrarily decide what gets to be “good?”

To this I would counter with another question: is the God attested to in scripture one of arbitrary action, standards, and character, or does he display consistency in all of these areas?

The first time we meet God in the Old Testament, we see him acting and naming the outcome of his action as good. This first act was, of course, creation. Not destruction, which we as humans intuitively understand to be “bad,” but creation, which we understand as “good.” His commands for his people consistently upheld the value of life, care for others, and reverence for himself. The things that angered him were the things that devalued life, that took advantage of others, and disregarded himself. He was in no way arbitrary.

We also must understand that the goodness that is inherent in God’s character can beget only goodness. How can one who is “all-good” determine that something contrary to his own nature should be understood as good? To assume not only the possibility but also the actuality is itself an illogical contradiction. (This is actually a philosophical argument based on a theological assumption.)

The dilemma created by the conflict between omnipotence and omnibenevolence was most famously debated in Plato’s Euthyphro, a work that was written in Greece in 5^th Century BCE. This was a time when polytheism was at its height, and the gods were understood more as reflections of imperfect human character than as divine perfection. It would have been expected for a “deity” to be inconsistent and contradictory in his or her actions and responses to humans. The consistent and faithful character of Yahweh would have been a difficult concept for someone in Plato’s culture to accept.

The God of the Bible, however, is not a reflection of human character, but the perfect form or pattern of what humans were intended to be. (Plato would have appreciated that analogy.) God is consistent ~ Malachi 3:6. His character is not contradictory, and he does not act in ways that are contradictory ~Hebrews 13:8. Therefore, we can trust him to be consistently good ~ James 1:17.

This dilemma in ethics is one place where philosophy and theology don’t seem to get along with each other well. But when you take a closer look, it becomes apparent that philosophy actually needs theology in order to answer the question completely. Without theology, philosophy is left without satisfactory answers. Even Euthyphro ends without coming to any real resolution. But when invited to the conversation, theology fills the gap and brings about a quite logical response (in my opinion) to this difficult dilemma.